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The Role of Mortgages: A Case for Formal Law 
Guanghua Yu

 
Abstract 
 
Law and development scholars have downplayed the role of formal 
law in China‟s economic development in favor of informality. Through an 
analysis of the Chinese mortgage regime, this essay shows that formal legal 
institutions have in fact made a positive contribution to China‟s economic 
development.  The economic theory of self-enforcing contracts suggests that a 
contract is self-enforcing if the expected future gains from adhering to the 
contract exceed the current gain from a violation of the contract. In addition, 
economists argue for the importance of using informal contractual means to 
enforce contracts.  For example, contractual parties may "take hostage" from 
the other contractual party to support exchange. (The term "hostage" signifies 
valuable property transferred by one contracting party to the other that may be 
forfeit in the case of breach of promise or non-performance by the transferring 
party. In 1983, Oliver Williamson argued for the importance of using hostages 
to support exchange in informal contractual settings.)  But hostage used in 
informal contracts normally only deals with two contractual parties. This essay 
uses evidence from China‟s developing formal property law covering 
mortgages to argue that when built upon and enforced by the formal law, the 
device of mortgages can cope with conflicts of interest among a large number of 
creditors. Analysis of the Chinese mortgage regime shows that there are clear 
limits to reliance upon informal contractual arrangements in Chinese economic 
development. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Contract law facilitates exchange in the sense that it makes the gain 
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from trade more predictable. Efficient exchange, however, requires the 
existence of clear property rights. North claims that “the inability of societies 
to develop effective, low cost enforcement of contracts is the most important 
source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in 
the Third world.”1 Some evidence in China and elsewhere is consistent with 
North‟s claim.2 Enforcement of contracts, however, can be carried out by 
informal or formal means.
3
 The economic theory of self-enforcing contracts 
suggests that a contract is self-enforcing either because the expected future 
gains from adhering to the contract exceed the current gain from a violation of 
the contract.
4
 It is obvious that self-enforcing agreements are not feasible if 
the sequence of occasions for transactions has a definite known last period.
5
 
In addition, highly uncertain conditions are not conducive to self-enforcing 
agreements.
6
 In the modern world, however, unexpected things occur very 
frequently. The Asian financial crisis, the recent US financial crisis, significant 
change of cost conditions resulting from commodity price fluctuation are some 
of the unexpected events which are likely to affect the payoff of contractual 
parties. To support exchanges, contractual parties may take hostage from the 
other contractual party.
7
 If hostage is used, non-performance by a contractual 
party will result in the loss of or harm to the hostage.  
 This article argues that hostage used in informal contracts normally 
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only deal with two contractual parties. Built upon and enforced by the formal 
law, the device of mortgages is able to cope with multiparty conflict of interest. 
Contrary to the prevailing view that formal legal institutions do not play any 
important role in China‟s economic development,8 this article makes a case 
that the formal legal institution does make a difference in China‟s economic 
development. Section II of this article explains that a formal legal system is 
essential to deal with problems arising from mortgages. Section III uses 
empirical evidence on the increasing use of mortgages in China to show the 
role of mortgages in facilitating bank lending. Conclusions follow in Section 
IV. 
 
II. The Device of Mortgages and Formal Law 
 
 When the present value of the expected future benefits from 
maintaining an agreement exceeds that of the expected benefits from a 
violation of the agreement, the agreement becomes “self-enforcing.” 
According to Telser, the only recourse of the non-breaching party in a 
self-enforcing agreement is to terminate the agreement.
9
 Williamson shows 
that “the use of hostages to support exchange is widespread and economically 
important.
10
 Using hostages to support bilateral foreign relations in China can 
be traced back to 720 B.C.
11
 Viewed from the perspective of using hostage, 
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the expected future stream of benefits from maintaining a self-enforcing 
agreement can be viewed as hostage. Violation of such an agreement will 
result in the loss of the hostage. That is the termination of the agreement and 
the resulting loss of the expected future stream of benefits.
12
  
 Klein and Leffler deal with the issue of quality guarantee in sales 
transactions.
13
 A major finding of their paper is that “market prices above the 
competitive price and the presence of non-salvageable capital are means of 
enforcing quality promises.”14 If the seller cheats by lowering the quality 
standard in a transaction, the spread of complaints of consumers will result in 
reduced sales or loss of sales. When reduced sales or loss of sales occur, the 
seller will either lose the market price above the competitive price or suffer 
loss on the non-salvageable asset investment. Viewed from that perspective, 
market price of the seller above the competitive price and the loss of benefits 
from using the non-salvageable asset because of the reallocation of the asset 
for the next best alternative can be regarded as hostage. Advertising
15
 and 
developing products with brand names
16
 normally indicate that a company is 
investing in non-salvageable assets and the presence of a current and future 
price premium.  
 Klein argues that a franchisor acting as a franchisee‟s landlord can 
discipline an opportunistic franchisee by imposing a sunk-cost penalty on him. 
Franchisors can better 
…assure quality by requiring franchisee investments in specific … assets 
that upon termination imply a capital loss penalty larger than can be 
obtained by the franchisee if he cheats. For example, the franchisor may 
require franchisees to rent from them short term (rather than own) the land 
upon which their outlet is located. This lease arrangement creates a situation 
where termination can require the franchisee to move and thereby impose a 
capital loss on him up to the amount of his initial non-salvageable 
investment. Hence a form of collateral to deter franchisee cheating is 
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created.
17
 
 In business franchising, the hostage may be the capital cost of the 
vulnerable sunk investment.
18
 Alternatively, the hostage may be the value of 
future above-normal profit earnings for the franchisee.
19
 Termination of the 
franchising contract will result in both types of loss. Empirical evidence on 
franchising relations in the United Kingdom, however, does not strongly 
support the view that termination of the franchising contract will necessarily 
result in the loss of location specific investment.
20
 Lease termination is 
subject to very careful private regulation including the inclusion of 
arbitration clause, renewal, or buy back of franchisee‟s assets.21 The purpose 
of lease control by the franchisor is rather due to the high cost in finding a 
suitable new site.
22
 
The term “mortgage” refers to a transaction whereby a debtor or a 
third party (“mortgagor”) uses certain property (“mortgaged property”) as 
security for an obligation without the transfer of the possession of such 
property. If the debtor fails to fulfill his or her obligation, the creditor 
(“mortgagee”) has priority over the mortgaged property.23 Viewed from the 
perspective of hostage, mortgaged property can be considered as hostage. 
This is so because the failure of performing the obligation by the debtor will 
lead to the disposition of the mortgaged property. When the mortgaged 
property chosen to secure debt consists of assets whose value in the 
borrower‟s business exceeds their market value, the harm to a borrower that 
defaults under a mortgage contract is the loss of the idiosyncratic value. 
Since the particular mortgaged property may be used to secure several debts, 
default on any of the debts will result in the loss of the hostage. Put it another 
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way, the probability of losing the hostage in mortgage contracts is greater 
than in other simple bilateral contracts. 
The above discussion on the hostage used in self-enforcing contracts 
and in mortgage contracts raises a very important question on the 
institutional difference between simple self-enforcing contracts and mortgage 
contracts. After all, a simple bilateral mortgage contract is also self-enforcing. 
When a piece of mortgaged property is used to secure separate debts, the 
mortgagor faces several secured creditors, mortgagees. The device of 
mortgages can be used to deal with multiple creditors. The rest of this section 
will explain why the device of mortgages is different from simple bilateral 
self-enforcing contracts. 
 Williamson has remarked: 
The study of contract in both law and economics has mainly emphasized 
legal rules and technicalities. Such an orientation is supported by the 
implicit assumption that the courts “work well.” Whether they work well or 
poorly, however, requires a comparative institutional assessment.
24
  
 I take Williamson‟s suggestion to carry out a comparative institutional 
assessment to examine the mortgage regime.  
In Telser‟s simple bilateral contract model discussed previously, each 
contractual party calculates whether s/he is better off continuing or terminating 
the relation with the other party. S/he terminates the contractual relation if and 
only if the current gain from termination exceeds the present value of the 
expected gains from continuing. Such a self-enforcing model becomes 
problematic, however, when it is extended to multilateral agreements. 
Discussing in the context of international trade, Beth Yarbrough and Robert 
Yarbrough have observed that “delicate balancing of costs and benefits may be 
difficult to accomplish with large numbers of participants.”25 Different rounds 
of negotiating multilateral trade agreements show how long and difficult it is 
to reach multilateral trade agreements. In the case of a mortgage contract, a 
debtor may face numerous creditors. Furthermore, when a mortgage contract 
is enforced upon default, the relations between the borrower and secured 
creditors normally come to an end as far as the particular mortgaged property 
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is concerned. 
Klein and Leffler‟s model deals with promises on quality which cannot 
be verified by a court. If consumers expect the product to be of high quality 
but the seller offers a low-quality product to the unsuspecting buyers, the 
seller can reap a short-run profit. “Cheating will be prevented and high quality 
products will be supplied only if firms are earning a continued stream of rental 
income that will be lost if low quality output is deceptively produced.”26 In 
their model, a single breach on quality can exact a heavy cost through the 
costless communication of the breach on the market. As discussed, market 
prices above the competitive price and the presence of non-salvageable capital 
are means of enforcing quality promises. Their model, however, does not deal 
with multiple bilateral transactions when one party faces numerous creditors. 
In the latter case, contractual devices have to deal with not only relations 
between the debtor and other creditors but also relations between creditors. In 
some other cases, legal devices also need to regulate the relations between 
secured creditors and purchasers for value in good face. 
While Klein and Leffler focused on market forces in contract 
enforcement, Avner Grief‟s study of the relations between the Maghribi 
merchants and their overseas agents in the Mediterranean during the late 
medieval Commercial Revolution shows how a non-market reputation-based 
institution worked.
27
 In his study, information sharing and multilateral 
punishment enabled credible commitment of agents to merchants ex ante and 
effective fulfillment of contractual obligations ex post.
28
 Similar to Klein and 
Leffler, Grief does not deal with problems arising from multiple bilateral 
contractual relations. 
In the case of mortgage, a mortgagor may use the same collateral to 
borrow money from different creditors. When the mortgagor defaults and the 
value of the collateral is unable to satisfy the claims of all the mortgagees, 
each mortgagee has the incentive to seize the collateral and realize its right 
ahead of other creditors. This collective action problem faced by secured 
creditors requires a third party enforcement regime. To solve the priority issue, 
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most countries have developed a formal regime. The normal rule is that the 
order of priority of the several mortgagees must be ascertained, and the first in 
priority paid in full before anything is given to those who rank below him in 
priority.
29
 So far we have not seen an informal regime which is able to solve 
the priority competition issue between mortgagees efficiently. 
The administration of the formal regime of mortgage law requires a 
functional court system. In addition, a separate registration system must be 
established so that mortgaged property can be registered. Such a registration 
system serves an important purpose of recording the sequence of all 
mortgaged property of a particular mortgagor. With this registration system, 
potential mortgagees, trade or financial creditors, can easily search whether a 
particular debtor has used the same asset to secure debts before. Without a 
registration system, creditors will have great difficulty finding out whether the 
debtor has used the same asset to secure debts. When creditors face great 
uncertainty, they will either reduce credit or lend at a higher interest rate. In 
either case, the cost of capital formation will be higher. 
If a country cannot establish a registration system and a formal legal 
system, the device of secured debt has to be foregone. Economists claim the 
importance of the device of secured debt. First, secured debt may solve the 
debt erosion problem. As a secured lender can usually perfect its security 
interest easily when there is a registration system, it enjoys priority over 
subsequent lenders. As a result, the debtor cannot issue subsequent debt of 
equal or higher priority. Therefore, unless the secured creditor is under-secured, 
the opportunity to redistribute wealth by the debtor through subsequent debt 
financing is effectively neutralized.
30
 In addition, security interests make the 
substitution of high-risk for low-risk assets after obtaining the loan more 
difficult.
31
 After obtaining the loan, the borrower may have the incentive to 
substitute projects with more variable cash flow for projects with less variable 
cash flow. As creditors are not able to share with the debtor the upside benefits 
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from the borrower‟s asset substitution but must bear the downside risk, asset 
substitution transfers wealth from creditors to the debtor. If the debt is secured, 
however, those secured assets cannot be easily disposed of without permission 
of the secured creditor. Furthermore, secured debt can ameliorate the 
underinvestment problem.
32
 Some profitable projects will not be undertaken 
by a borrower which can use only equity or unsecured debt to finance them 
but will be undertaken if they can be financed with secured debt. Besides, 
secured interests over specific assets impair their marketability. This is so 
because the transfer of secured assets not made in the ordinary course of the 
debtor‟s business passes title to the purchaser subject to the perfected security 
interest.
33
 Therefore, secured debt makes it difficult for the debtor to transfer 
wealth from secured creditors to itself. As secured debt serves important 
purposes of alleviating the above examined moral hazard problems, the 
inability of establishing a secured debt regime including mortgages results in a 
dead-weight social loss. 
Williamson argues for the importance of using hostages to support 
exchange in informal contractual settings. He also cites Klein and Leffler‟s 
point that requiring franchisees to rent from the franchisor the outlet can 
reduce opportunistic behaviors on the part of the franchisee.
34
 When the 
franchisee cheats on quality of the good or price, the franchisor can require the 
franchisee to move and “thereby impose a capital loss on him up to the amount 
of his initial non-salvageable investment on the outlet.
35
 As discussed 
previously, Dnes‟s empirical study in the United Kingdom does not support 
Williamson‟s view. 36  Moreover, while hostages can be used to support 
exchange, they may also be abused. The person possessing the hostage may 
have the incentive to expropriate the hostage by creating conditions of 
contractual termination. In addition, the secured creditor may not have the 
incentive to make reasonable efforts in obtaining the best possible price on the 
market when disposing of the collateral, causing harm to the mortgagor and 
other mortgagees. When a formal legal regime is used to enforce law and 
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33
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contracts, using hostages to support exchange becomes unnecessary. 
With respect to the potential of expropriating the hostage, both private 
contracts and formal law regulates such misbehavior. Contractual parties in the 
context of franchising in the United Kingdom insert arbitration, renewal, and 
asset-valuation clauses in their contracts to curb the potential abuse of the 
hostage.
37
 Formal law in the United States also deals with such potential 
abuse of the hostage.
38
 
Formal legal also carefully regulates the misbehaviors of mortgagees 
caused by the lack of incentives in disposing of the mortgaged property. In the 
United Kingdom, a mortgagee is under a duty to take reasonable care to obtain 
the true market value of the mortgaged property.
39
 A building society has a 
duty “to take reasonable care to ensure that the price for which the property is 
sold is the best price that can be reasonably obtained.”40 Obviously, the law 
tries to solve the problem that the mortgagee may not have the incentive to sell 
the mortgaged property at a reasonable price, causing loss to the mortgagor or 
other mortgagees. In Australia, “a receiver owes duties to the mortgagor, 
primarily to exercise powers in good faith not sacrificing the mortgagor‟s 
interest recklessly, to act strictly within the conditions of appointment, to 
account to the mortgagor for surplus after the discharge of securities and, if 
property is to be sold, a duty to obtain the best possible price.”41 In China, the 
Law on Real Property also requires that the sale of mortgaged property must 
be done with reference to the market price.
42
  
This section explains that the device of mortgages requires the support 
of a formal legal regime. Under a formal legal system, the use of hostages to 
support exchange becomes unnecessary. In addition, a formal legal system 
solves the problem of abusing the hostage relatively well. As the device of 
mortgages can solve many types of moral hazard problems after the debtor 
obtains the loan and secures well the principal and interest, secured debt of 
mortgages is widely used in many developed countries. The increasing use of 
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38
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mortgages in China also provides empirical evidence that mortgages facilitate 
bank lending. The precondition of developing a formal legal regime of 
mortgages is, however, the improvement in defining and enforcing property 
rights. The next section will examine the evolution of property rights in China. 
The section will then explain the relation between the increasing use of 
mortgages and the expansion of bank lending. Other things being equal, the 
greater the amount of banking lending, the higher the growth rate of the 
economy. The case of the developing legal regime of mortgages raises doubt 
on the claim that formal law does not play any meaningful role in China‟s 
economic development. 
 
III. Mortgages Law and Bank Lending 
 
 In the last 10 years or so, as economic reform reaches a more mature 
stage in China, secured lending through mortgages, a more formal form of 
financial contract has become more widespread. In a recent study, Haselmann 
and his colleagues conducted an empirical study to examine the relationship 
between reform of bankruptcy law and collateral law and behavioral changes 
by banks in their lending activities.
43
 One of the findings of their study is that 
„collateral law designed to protect individual creditors‟ claims is of greater 
importance for expanding bank lending than is bankruptcy law, which is aimed 
at establishing a collective enforcement regime.
44
 One implication of this 
study is that if secured lending contracts are legally enforceable, the adoption 
of them will increase bank credits as well as the quality of these credits. 
Before examining the growing use of mortgages in China, I will briefly 
discuss the developing legal framework on mortgages. 
 
A. The Legal Framework 
 
1. The law of mortgages on immovable property 
 
As urban land is closely related to the real estate market and China‟s 
                                                 
43
 Rainer Haselmann et al., “How Law Affects Lending”, 1 (Columbia Law and Economics 
Working Paper No. 285, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=846665. 
44
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high rate of economic growth, tracing the evolution of the ownership and 
transfer of real property will provide an institutional explanation of the role of 
property law. Despite the fact that neither the 1954 Constitution nor the 1978 
Constitution states as clearly as the 1982 Constitution that urban land is owned 
by the state,
45
 land use had been allocated by the government without any fee 
payment by users from 1954 to 1979.
46
 As the scarcity of land was not well 
reflected by such an administrative allocation system, there was a great deal of 
waste.
47
 The economic reform program initiated in 1978 started to pay 
attention to the issue of efficient land use. The Equity Joint Venture Law 
between Chinese Partners and Foreign Investors enacted in 1979 makes it 
possible for the Chinese partner to use land-use right as equity contribution.
48
 
If land-use right was not treated as equity contribution by the Chinese partner, 
the equity joint venture should pay fees for obtaining the land-use right to the 
Chinese government.
49
 This was the starting point of changing the free urban 
land-use system. In 1982, Shenzhen began to charge land-use fees from 
users.
50
 Since then, the practice of charging land-use fees has spread to the 
whole nation. Except for a few types of institutions, all profit-oriented 
enterprises have to pay land-use fee.
51
 While the initial purpose of charging 
land-use fee is to solve the shortage of capital for urban development, the 
greater significance of the adoption of land-use right system is the reshaping 
of the administrative allocation of land-use system. 
The initial success of charging land-use fee prompted more changes 
related to land-use transfer. Although the land-use fee system was adopted, the 
1982 Constitution still prohibited appropriation, buying and selling, or leasing 
of land or the transfer of land by other unlawful means.
52
 Article 80(3) of the 
General Principle of the Civil Law (GPCL) stipulates, among other things, that 
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46
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51
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52
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land cannot be purchased and sold, leased, or mortgaged.
53
 In July 1987, 
however, the Office of the Special Economic Zones under the State Council 
proposed to the State Council that Shanghai, Tianjing, Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen should be used as trial cities to experiment with the transfer of 
land-use right system.
54
 Under this system, applicants may acquire the right of 
using a specific piece of land for up to 50 years through bidding or auction, or 
by entering into an agreement with the relevant government upon the payment 
of a fee. Thereafter, the user may transfer the land-use right to another person 
for the remaining period.
55
 In 1988, the 1982 Constitution was formally 
amended to permit the lawful transfer of land-use right.
56
 Thereafter, the Law 
on the Administration of Land
57
 was amended in 1988. One of the 
amendments was to establish the pay for land-use right system and to 
incorporate the constitutional amendment that land-use right can be lawfully 
transferred.
58
 The State Council promulgated in 1990 the Provisional 
Regulation Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of Land-use Right of 
State-owned Land in Urban Areas.
59
 Since then the system of pay for using 
land and the assignment and transfer of land-use right has been well 
established. The Law on the Administration of Urban Real Estate
60
 enacted in 
1994 and amended in 2007,
61
 and the Law on Real Rights
62
 enacted in 2007 
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follow that system. 
In addition to the establishment of the system of paying for using land 
and of the assignment and transfer of land-use right, the housing reform policy 
in urban areas has also contributed to the better definition and enforcement of 
property rights of urban real estate. 
Before 1988, employees in urban areas all lived in houses or 
apartments allocated by their enterprises or institutions. They did not have 
ownership of the houses or apartments and only paid a symbolic rent. The 
success of market oriented reform in the areas of trade, investment, and 
employment led to the housing reform. The housing reform was initiated in 
1988 when the State Council circulated the Notice Concerning the 
Implementation Plan of Promoting Housing Reform in Urban Areas.
63
 While 
the immediate objective of the housing reform was to raise the rent, the long 
term objective was to realize the goal of allocating houses or apartments 
through the market.
64
 In 1994, the State Council issued the Decision on 
Deepening the Reform of Urban Housing System.
65
 The gist of the Decision 
was to incorporate the housing benefits into the salary of employees so that the 
high income families could buy commercial houses (shangpinfang) while the 
middle and low income families could purchase subsidized suitable economy 
houses (jingji shiyongfang) or lease low-rent apartments (lianzufang).
66
 In 
addition, the Decision also instructed local governments to gradually establish 
the system of house accumulation fund (zhufang gongjijin)
67
 to facilitate 
policy and commercial bank lending, and to regulate the real estate market.
68
 
Besides, the Decision also urged local governments to sell the then existing 
houses or apartments to employees.
69
 Those who purchased the houses at 
market prices could later sell their houses right away while those who 
purchased their houses at cost should also be able to sell their houses in five 
                                                                                                                                
Columbia Journal of Asian Law 179 (2009). 
63
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64
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65
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66
 Id. 
67
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years time.
70
 This Decision sent out a very clear signal to the urban residents 
that buying and selling houses on the market was the future direction. In 1998, 
the State Council issued the Notice Concerning the Further Deepening of 
Housing Reform and the Acceleration of Housing Construction in Urban 
Areas.
71
 This Notice urged local governments to terminate the internal 
allocation of housing property to employees.
72
 To address the problem that 
the least advantaged people in urban areas cannot afford to buy either 
commercial houses or subsidized suitable economy houses, the Notice 
required local governments or enterprises to provide low-rent houses to this 
group of residents.
73
 Among other things, the Notice also instructed 
commercial banks to expand the scope of home-purchasing loans and the local 
governments to improve the system of registration of mortgage loans. 
The housing reform has also led to the development of the real estate 
registration system. The early registration of land-use right and houses or 
apartments occurred at the local level. The Administrative Provisions on 
Commodity Housing in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone was the earliest 
local law on the registration of housing ownership.
74
 This local law contains 
detailed provisions regarding the registration of the ownership of houses, 
transfer of title, and mortgage of housing property.
75
 The Regulation on the 
Administration of Land in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone dealt with the 
registration of land-use right and mortgages of land-use right.
76
 Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, and Beijing had similar local laws in the 1980s.
77
 In 1994, the 
Law on the Administration of Urban Real Estate was enacted at the national 
level.
78
 This Law requires the holders of land-use right or owners of housing 
property to register their property rights.
79
 The assignment of land-use right, 
housing property, and the mortgage of these property rights shall also be 
                                                 
70
 Id. 
71
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registered with the relevant authorities.
80
 Currently, the registration offices in 
big cities provide relatively good access for the public to searching the title of 
land-use rights, the title of housing property, and the mortgage of land-use 
rights and housing properties.
81
 It goes without saying that the real estate 
registration system has significantly improved the definition of property rights. 
Furthermore, the registration system of real estate has also facilitated the 
provision of mortgage loans.  
 
2. The law of mortgages on movable property 
 
An important part of the financial reform in China is to reform the 
banking sector. In 1978, there were only two banks in China:
82
 the People‟s 
Bank of China, engaged in domestic banking, and the Bank of China, which 
dealt with foreign currency business.
83
 Beginning in 1979, China 
reconstructed the previously dissolved Agricultural Bank of China and the 
Peoples‟ Construction Bank of China.84 On January 1, 1980, the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China was established.
85
 In 1983, the State Council 
decided to have the People‟s Bank of China solely exercise the functions of a 
central bank.
86
 In 1984, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China took 
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over the commercial business from the People‟s Bank of China. Since then, 
the People‟s Bank of China has gradually become the central bank of China.87 
As a result of the banking reform, four specialized banks have emerged: the 
Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China, and the People‟s Construction Bank of China. Since the 
enactment of the Law on Commercial Banks in 1995, these specialized banks 
have become normal commercial banks.  
By the end of 1993, these banks accounted for eighty percent of the 
total assets of the banking sector in China.
88
 Encouraged to act more like 
commercial enterprises, these banks are, at least in theory, responsible for 
raising their own funds and paying interest to depositors.
89
 Enterprises are no 
longer given an automatic right to credit and banks are to allocate funds on the 
basis of enterprise profitability.
90
 To make loans more efficient, banks have 
started to adopt security devices including mortgages.
91
 Before turning to the 
statistics on the use of mortgage of movables in the next Part of this Section, I 
will briefly examine the law of mortgages on movables. 
The General Principle of the Civil Law (GPCL)
92
 contains only one 
provision on mortgages. This article only provides the definition of mortgages 
and declares that people may adopt the device of mortgage to secure 
obligations. As it was difficult to apply this provision to resolve disputes on 
mortgages, the Supreme People‟s Court added five provisions when it issued 
the Opinion Concerning Several Issues related to the Implementation of the 
General Principles of the Civil Law (GPCL Opinion).
93
 Article 115(1) of the 
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GPCL Opinion provides that transfer of mortgaged property without the 
consent of the mortgagee is invalid. Article 115(2) specifies that priority 
competition among mortgagees is based on the sequence of the creation of 
mortgages. The GPCL Opinion, however, does not require the registration of 
mortgages. Obviously, such a system makes it hard for creditors to decide on 
whether to take mortgages as they are not able to search the registration from a 
third party about the borrower‟s past record of providing collaterals to other 
creditors. 
When the utilization of mortgages increased and when participants and 
law makers gained experience, improvement of the law took place. In 1995, 
the Security Law was enacted.
94
 Compared with the earlier law, this Security 
Law is far more detailed. In accordance with this law, borrowers can use 
machinery, means of transportation and other property to secure obligations.
95
 
For the first time, this Security Law dictates that the mortgage of means of 
transportation, machinery and other movable property of enterprises shall be 
registered.
96
 Also according to this law, the mortgaged contract becomes 
effective upon registration. In 2000, the Supreme People‟s Court issued the 
Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Security 
Law
97
 to clarify some unclear matters in the Security Law.  
When the use of mortgages further increased and more disputes were 
dealt with by the courts, the Law on Real Rights
98
 passed in 2007 further 
improved the law of mortgages. Pursuant to the Law on Real Rights, the 
mortgage of real property requires registration.
99
 The rights and duties 
between the mortgagor and mortgagee with respect to the mortgage of real 
property are effective only upon registration.
100
 With respect to movables, 
registration is optional. Non-registration of mortgage of movables, however, 
will not allow the mortgagee to defeat an innocent third party.
101
 The Law on 
                                                 
94
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Real Rights also adopted the floating mortgage concept whereby the present 
and future machinery, raw materials, semi-finished products or products of 
sole-proprietor, enterprises, or agricultural production operators can be 
mortgaged.
102
 It goes without saying that the Law on Real Rights has 
considerably enlarged the scope of mortgage of movable property.  
The rule on priority competition is relatively clear and easy to 
administer in practice. In accordance with the Law on Real Rights, if the 
mortgage rights have been registered, the priority among mortgagees is 
determined by the sequence of registration.
103
 If registration of several 
mortgages occurs on the same date, the claims of mortgagees shall be realized 
proportionally.
104
 Between registered mortgagees and non-registered 
mortgagees, registered mortgagees prevail over non-registered mortgagees.
105
 
For non-registered mortgagees, the inadequate assets or proceeds of the debtor 
will be shared proportionally.
106
  
The above short description of the law of mortgage of movable 
property shows that the Chinese law of mortgage of movables adapted to 
changing circumstances. It evolved from the very beginning with a very vague 
provision to a relatively functional regime of mortgage law. The Chinese 
experience provides a good lesson that it may not be appropriate for 
developing countries to transplant very sophisticated Western law at the 
beginning of economic development or economic transition from a planned 
economy to a market oriented economy. What is important is for law makers, 
participants, and enforcement agencies to adapt and solve problems during the 
development process. When the value of asset increases, people tend to devote 
more resources to defining and enforcing property rights in mortgages. The 
Next part on statistical evidence will shed further light on this issue. 
 
B. The Evidence and Explanations 
 
1. Evidence on mortgage of immovable property 
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GDP, Fixed Asset Investment, and Investment in Urban Houses 
  Unit: 100 Million Yuan 
Year Gross  
Domestic 
Product  
(GDP) 
GDPGrowth 
Rate % 
(calculated at 
constant 
prices) 
Total 
Investment  
in  
Fixed Assets 
Growth 
Rate of 
Total 
Investment 
in Fixed 
Assets % 
Investment 
in Urban  
Housing   
Investment in 
Urban Housing 
in Total Fixed 
Asset 
Investment %  
1986 10275.2 8.8 3120.6 22.7 219 7.0 
1987 12058.6 11.6 3791.7 21.5 240 6.3 
1988 15042.8 11.3 4735.8 25.4 - - 
1989 16992.3 4.1 4410.4 -7.2 359 8.1 
1990 18667.8 3.8 4517.0 2.4 321 7.1 
1991 21781.5 9.2 5594.5 23.9 406 7.25 
1992 26923.5 14.2 8080.1 44.4 411 5.1 
1993 35333.9 14 13072.3 61.8 637 4.9 
1994 48197.9 13.1 17042.1 30.4 1446 8.5 
1995 60793.7 10.9 20019.3 17.5 1303 6.5 
1996 71176.6 10 22974.0 14.8 1407 6.1 
1997 78973.0 9.3 24941.1 8.8 3509 14.1 
1998 84402.3 7.8 28406.2 13.9 3799 13.4 
1999 89677.1 7.6 29854.7 5.1 3718 12.5 
2000 99214.6 8.4 32917.7 10.3 3608 11.0 
2001 109655.2 8.3 37213.5 13.0 5616 15 
2002 120332.7 9.1 43499.9 16.9 5319 12.2 
2003 135822.8 10 55566.6 27.7 5078 9.1 
2004 159878.3 10.1 70477.4 26.6 8919 12.6 
2005 183084.8 10.2 88773.6 26.0 10727 12.1 
Sources：Except for the last two columns, the data of this table come from the 
China Urban Construction Statistical Yearbook (China Architecture & 
Building Press, 2005) at 171. The data on investment in urban housing 
property come from various years in the China City Statistical Yearbook 
(Beijing: China Statistical Press). 
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The above table shows a relatively close correlation between the GDP 
growth rate and the growth rate of fixed asset investment. Higher growth rate 
of fixed asset investment are more likely to result in higher growth rate of 
GDP in the same year. This is true for all years except 1998. On the other 
hand, lower growth rate of fixed asset investment are more likely to result in 
lower growth rate of GDP in the same year. The best examples are 1989, 
1990, and 1999. 
This table has also confirmed the importance of investment in urban 
housing property in China’s economic development. When fixed asset 
investment plays a very important role in China‟s economic development, the 
increasing proportion of investment in urban housing property in total fixed 
asset investment explains the growing importance of investment in urban 
housing property. The last column of the above table reveals that the 
proportion of investment in urban housing property in total fixed asset 
investment has been doubled since 1997 compared with that in the period 
from 1986 to 1996. Viewed from the property rights perspective, it is more 
difficult to have such a considerably increasing amount of investment in 
urban housing property without clear definition and enforcement of property 
rights in the property law system. The easy search of titles of land-use rights 
and housing property and of the burden of mortgage in such real property in 
large cities in China has significantly facilitated transactions in real estate 
assets.  
The move towards market orientation in allocating land-use rights 
on the primary market provides good evidence of the improving definition 
and transfer of land-use rights. While administrative allocation of free land 
use remains, that proportion has been decreasing. The allocation of land-use 
rights with fee payment has become more and more relied upon. There are 
three main methods of allocating land-use rights in the latter case.
107
 They 
include agreement between the relevant governmental authority and the land 
user, auction whereby the governmental authority publically sells the 
                                                 
107
 Provisional Regulation on the Allocation and Transfer of State-owned Land-Use Rights in 
Urban Areas, issued by the State Council on May 19, 1990. This Regulation is reprinted in the 
Collection of the Laws of the PRC, 1764 (Jilin: Jilin People‟s Press, 1990-1992). Later laws 
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land-use rights to the person who is willing to pay the highest price, and 
bidding where the government authority invites potential users to submit bids 
and the person who is willing to pay the highest price is normally chosen. In 
1993, 152,676 hectares of land were allocated nationwide.
108
 Among them, 
around 89,750 hectares were allocated by administrative methods for free use 
(huabo), accounting for 58.78%
109
 while around 62,926 hectares were 
allocated through auction, bidding or agreement, occupying the remaining 
41.22% (churang). In 2001, allocation of land through auction, bidding, or 
agreement accounted for 55.5 % of the total allocation of 164,000 hectares.
110
 
Since then, allocation of land-use rights through churang has taken a 
dominant position.
111
 
Among the three methods of allocating land with pay, the method of 
agreement (xieyi churang) is becoming less significant. In 1987-88, 
allocation of land with pay through agreement accounted for 96.7% of the 
total area.
112
  The percentage of 81.2% of the total land allocation in terms 
of size through agreement in 1992 remained very high.
113
 Since 2002, 
allocation of land-use rights through auctions and/or biddings have began to 
increase. The percentage of land allocation through auctions and/or biddings 
was 15% in 2002, 33% in 2003 and 50.9% in 2007 respectively.
114
 Higher 
prices in obtaining land-use rights for urban development reveal that users 
including developers have confidence in the security of their investment in 
real estate. Clear definition and transferability of property rights in real estate 
are the precondition for investment. 
Cross country comparison provides further empirical evidence that 
formal law on property right is critical in economic development. Writing in 
the context of Peru, Do Soto has the view that the inability to produce capital 
is a stumbling block to economic development. The source of the problem lies 
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in the legal system. He specifically provides:
115
 
It is the law that detaches and fixes the economic potential of assets as a 
value separate from the material assets themselves and allows humans to 
discover and realize that potential. It is law that connects assets into 
financial and investment circuits. And it is the representation of assets 
fixed in legal property documents that gives them the power to create 
surplus value. 
While informal systems of contractual arrangements may partly 
substitute or complement formal contract law,
116
 the cost of relying on an 
informal system of property rights to acquire and enforce land rights can be 
enormous. De Soto summarized the cost in the following:
117
 
The range of choices open to informals when they decide to acquire land 
informally is limited. It also involves a tremendous waste of resources 
because of the high costs of invasion or informal land sales and the 
uncertainties inherent in illegality. The property rights acquired are 
diminished by a kind of legal apartheid. And the system is unstable because 
it does not protect the informals when others try to invade their land. The 
absence of a legal system of efficient property rights is detrimental to all. 
The contrast between China and Peru related to the definition and 
transfer of property rights in land and houses provides good lessons for other 
developing countries. 
Formal property law not only affects the security of investment in real 
estate but also influences the way people finance their investment in real 
property. Palomar observed that “when land titles and land tenure are secure, 
landholders may utilize their property rights as collateral for loans.”118 As the 
Chinese economy possesses strong characteristics of a dual economy in the 
sense that urban cities are relatively highly developed while rural areas are 
underdeveloped, a brief comparison between the outcomes resulting from the 
formal property law on land use is helpful.  
Whereas the definition, transfer, and registration of property rights of 
land and housing property in urban areas are relatively certain as discussed in 
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the previous part, things are different in rural areas. There were restrictions on 
the conversion of rural land to land for non-agricultural use from 1987 to 2006. 
The dominant concern behind the restrictions is the worry about the quick 
depletion of arable land in a country with a huge population. Restrictions 
began to increase when the economy started to grow at a fast rate in the 
middle of 1980s. The 1986 Law on the Administration of Land still provided 
three methods of converting rural land to land for non-agricultural use.
119
 
First, when state-owned enterprises and collectively–owned enterprises in 
urban areas establish joint enterprises (lianying qiye) with collectively-owned 
enterprises in rural areas and need to use collectively-owned land in rural areas, 
these joint enterprises may convert the rural land to state-owned land after 
giving compensation to farmers or the collectively-owned enterprises in the 
rural area may use the land use rights as equity contribution after obtaining 
governmental approval.
120
Second, housing construction in rural areas, 
construction related to the establishment of village (township) enterprises, 
construction of village (township) public infrastructure, or construction of 
village (township) public utilities or welfare projects can be carried out after 
obtaining governmental approval.
121
 Third, when non-rural residents in urban 
areas have to use collectively-owned land in rural areas for the purpose of 
housing construction, they may use land in rural areas after obtaining 
governmental approval.
122
 A Circular of the State Council in 2006 prohibited 
the conversion of land for agricultural use to land for non-agricultural use by 
means of leasing instead of expropriation which has been subject to stricter 
control.
123
 
 In the 1998 Law on the Administration of Land, the third method 
discussed under the 1986 Law on the Administration of Land is no longer 
possible.
124
 Related to the abolishment of this method of converting land from 
agricultural use to non-agricultural use in this law, using rural land for 
residential purposes both for farmers and urban residents is very restrictive. 
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The 1986 Law on the Administration of Land provides that those farmer 
applicants who have sold or let their houses shall not be eligible for additional 
land for building houses.
125
 The 1998 Law on the Administration of Land 
further adds a provision that each household shall only have one piece of 
household land (Zhaijidi).126 Various governmental regulations or rules have 
also prohibited the purchase of rural houses by urban residents.
127
   
The very restrictive approach to the conversion of land from 
agricultural purpose to non-agricultural purposes and to the purchase of rural 
houses by urban residents turned many transactions into illegal or informal 
transactions. Despite some exceptions created by some local governments, 
using rural land as mortgage asset to finance various projects becomes very 
difficult.
128
  
The picture is very different in urban areas where land title and land 
tenure are relatively secure. The registration and search of land-use rights or 
housing title and mortgages of such assets are relatively easy. The statistical 
data of mortgages related to land use rights and housing property in urban 
China provide some empirical evidence on the positive correlation between 
the formal law of property rights and China‟s economic development. The 
following table shows the mortgage of land use rights in urban areas. 
Mortgage of Land-use Rights in Urban China
129
 
Year Total Land 
Turnover on the 
Secondary 
Market 
Mortgage of 
Land-Use 
Rights 
(hectares) 
Transfer of 
Land-Use 
Rights 
(hectares) 
Leasing of 
Land-Use 
Rights 
(hectares) 
Percentage of 
Mortgaged 
Land in Total 
Land 
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(hectares) Turnover 
2001 2290000 2140435 139304 10261 93.7% 
2002 372672 288821 66757 17272 77.5% 
2003 1185168 1102207 69633 9055 93% 
2004 3565376 3422761 66842 79876 96% 
The above table shows that the mortgage of land-use rights plays a 
significant role in financing investment in the real estate sector in urban China. 
There is a positive correlation between the growth of real estate loans and the 
growth of real estate investment as reflected in the following table. It goes 
without saying that without the mortgages, the amount of loans from banks 
would have been considerably smaller. 
Correlation between Real Estate Loans and Real Estate Investment
130
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Growth of 
real estate 
loans 
39% 117% 35% 42% 37% 23% 
Growth of 
real estate 
investment 
14% 19% 27% 24% 30% 28% 
In addition to the evidence on the mortgage of land-use rights in 
urban area, the increasing use of home mortgage for financing the purchase of 
housing property through bank loans has also contributed to economic growth. 
From 1999 to 2004, the average annual property development and home 
mortgage loans grew by 49%.
131
 By the end of 2004, the outstanding 
residential mortgage loans reached 1.6 trillion yuan, 83 times the amount in 
1997.
132
 In 2005, the outstanding mortgage loans amounted to 1.84 trillion 
yuan, accounting for 10% of the GDP in that year.
133
 
With the high rate of economic development in China, the value of 
land-use rights and/or housing property has also increased rapidly. The 
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increasing value of such real estate in turn induces people to devote more 
resources to define or enforce their property rights. The following table on the 
increasing number of legal disputes dealt with by courts in China from 1987 to 
2001 provides strong empirical evidence.
134
 The trend is particularly obvious 
from 1991. 
Real Property Disputes Dealt with by Chinese Courts 
Year Numbers 
1987 71110 
1988 68664 
1989 68229 
1990 55704 
1991 53938 
1992 58782 
1993 67736 
1994 82341 
1995 94234 
1996 109822 
1997 120732 
1998 140993 
1999 155782 
2000 165799 
2001 172750 
The discussion in this part shows the close correlation between policy 
and legal changes related to land-use rights and housing in urban areas and 
China‟s high rate of economic development. As urban residents in the past did 
not have ownership rights in their housing property which used to be small 
and crowed, reform in this area tend to be less difficult compared with reform 
of large state-owned enterprises, education reform or health care reform. The 
reform of the real estate market has obviously made most urban residents 
better off. The adoption of pay for using land has considerably increased the 
revenue of local governments. This in turn has provided great incentives for 
local governments to attract investment to their local areas. The relative easy 
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transfer of land-use rights in land and housing has also facilitated investment 
on the part of enterprises or individuals. The developing legal regime of 
China‟s urban real estate market provides some support of Anderson and Hill‟s 
theory.
135
 The dynamic ways of legal and property market development in 
China also indicate that the participants on China‟s real estate market are very 
adaptive. Decentralized experimentation in finding new ways of solving 
problems and making most parties in urban areas better off
136
 in the reform 
process shows that adaptive efficiency
137
 is vitally important in economic 
development and transition. 
 
3. Evidence on mortgage of movable property 
 
 The following table provides some statistical evidence concerning the 
use of mortgage of movable property by enterprises in China from 1997 to 
2005. 
Table on Mortgage of Movables 
Year Mortgage 
of 
Movable 
Property 
(Contract 
Numbers) 
Mortgage of Movable 
Property (Contract 
Amount)[Unit:10,000Yuan] 
1997 92817 36685713 
1998 114609 40903577 
1999 117459 48210788 
2000 98762 44129477 
2001 91239 46672150 
2002 86161 49811313 
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2003 86119 58757389 
2004 73997 69958379 
2005 69580 94098771 
Source: Various years from the Administration Yearbook of China 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (Beijing: Press of the Industry and 
Commerce, 2000-2006). 
The above table shows the increasing use of movable property as 
collateral for the purpose of securing loans. Although the number of contracts 
has declined since 1999, the value of contracts for the mortgage of movable 
property has been increasing except for the minor decrease in the year 2000. It 
is likely that the newly adopted floating mortgage device will further promote 
the use of movable property in bank lending. 
 
C. Questionnaire Survey 
 
 One bank at the national level and seven bank branches or regional 
banks in Xian responded to my questionnaire survey.
138
 When they were 
asked to explain the proportion of lending requiring security, seven responded 
that 75 to 100 % of the loans were secured; only one response suggested that 
50 to 75 % of the loans were secured. When they were requested to explain 
whether the use of security will affect the provision of credit by banks, six 
responded that the use of security will very significantly increase the 
probability of lending; two replied that the use of security will significantly 
affect their lending decision. The questionnaire survey provides collaborative 
evidence that formal contractual arrangements of mortgage have been widely 
used in business transactions in China. Without the device of secured debts, 
many bank loans probably would not have occurred. This is especially true 
during China‟s high rate of economic growth when firms have to supply goods 
to new trading partners. With respect to new trading partners, it is far more 
uncertain whether the suppliers will enter into contracts with these new trading 
partners in the future. It is equally true in cases where loans are used for 
infrastructure projects as it is not certain that borrowers will repeatedly 
undertake similar projects in the future and repeat transactions are likely.  
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The results of the questionnaire survey suggest the finding that 
secured lending is already an important part of overall lending by banks today. 
This is not surprising given the current economic development in China 
regarding economic actors. It is difficult for banks to establish the appropriate 
credit rating for borrowers and borrowing firms. Financial reporting 
procedures are not well-established by firms. Most firms are brand new or 
relatively new firms. There is insufficient formal information about prospects 
of proposed investment projects. To protect themselves, banks demand 
collaterals, without which there would be no lending or much reduced lending. 
However, the collaterals are of no value if the contracts governing them cannot 
be enforced. Thus, the increased use of secured lending, a more formal 
financial contract, is to meet the demand for credit from borrowers without 
putting lenders at an unacceptable risk. The development of secured lending in 
the last 20 years in China appears to be consistent with North‟s notion of 
adaptive efficiency.
139
  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This article has examined the increasing definition and enforcement 
of property rights in China. When the economy develops, people tend to 
devote more resources to clarifying the property rights of immovable property 
and movable property. The evidence is relatively clear that there is a positive 
correlation between the development of the formal legal regime and the 
expansion of bank lending. In this process, the developing legal regime on 
property rights has made an important contribution to China‟s economic 
development. Without the development of the regime of formal contract and 
property law, it is much more difficult that China would have had such a high 
rate of economic growth during the last 30 years. In this sense, this article 
differs from the view that the formal laws related to contract and property 
rights do not contribute to China‟s economic development. The evidence from 
China has implications to other developing or transitional economies that 
economic development requires a developing legal regime on contracts
140
 and 
property rights. The development of formal law on property rights in China 
also shows the importance of adaptive efficiency of law making and 
enforcement. Shaped by the political goal of economic development, formal 
law on property rights began to change in China. Changes, however, normally 
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occur in a piecemeal way by adapting to changing circumstances and learning 
from the past experience and lessons. The Chinese experience provides a good 
lesson that it may not be appropriate for developing countries to transplant 
very sophisticated Western law at the beginning of economic development or 
economic transition from planned economy to a market oriented economy. 
What is important is for law makers, participants on the market, and 
enforcement agencies to adapt and solve bottleneck problems during the 
development process. While Milhaupt and Pistor disagree with the static 
model that good law and enforcement necessarily mean good economic 
outcome, they do hold the view that the “relationship between law and 
markets” is a “highly iterative process of action and strategic reaction.”141 
Their dynamic approach to the relationship between law and markets from a 
comparative corporate governance perspective is very similar to my approach 
of explaining adaptive efficiency in law making and enforcement in China 
related to the development of the urban real estate market in this article and 
contract law development elsewhere.
142
 Another implication from the Chinese 
experience for relatively large countries like Russia, India, and Brazil is that 
changes on the national level usually follow successful decentralized 
experiments at local levels.  
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